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PUBLIC USE OR PRIVATE BENEFIT?
THE POST-KELO INTERSECTION OF RELIGIOUS
LAND USE AND THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE
Nicholas William Haddad*
INTRODUCTION

North Philadelphia, a neighborhood composed of predominantly poor,
working class African-Americans and Hispanics,I lies immediately north of
Philadelphia's Center City district. 2 Over the past thirty years, crime,
drugs, and economic recession took their toll on this once burgeoning
middle class neighborhood, and today North Philadelphia is among the
city's most troubled areas. 3 The U.S. Census Bureau indicates that Census
Tract 155, which is located entirely within North Philadelphia, has a 34%
employment rate. 4 More than 50% of its residents over the age of twentyfive have not graduated from high school 5 and 61.6% of its residents live
below the poverty level. 6 Despite these grim statistics, there are indications
that North Philadelphia is on the mend. 7 Residents are renovating once* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law; A.B., 2002, Georgetown
University. I would like to extend special thanks to Professor Sheila Foster, whose seminar
and guidance helped me think more critically about the issues presented in this Note.
1. See Kia Gregory, There Goes the Neighborhood,Phila. Weekly, Jan. 26, 2005, at 20;
About.com,
Neighborhoods
of
Philadelphia,
North
Philadelphia,
http://philadelphia.about.com/cs/neighborhoods/a/neighborhoods_2.htm (last visited Sept.
21, 2006).
2. See
Philadelphia
Neighborhoods,
Philadelphia
Planning
Districts,
http://www.phila.gov/neighborhoods/Neighborhoods-Phila/neighborhoods-phila.html
(last
visited Sept. 21, 2006).
3. Gregory, supra note 1, at 20; see also Sue Sierra, Transformers: Some Philly
'Hoods Aren t Taking Blight Lying Down, Phila. City Paper, Dec. 19, 2002, at 93 ("If blight
were an explosion, eastern North Philadelphia would be Ground Zero.").
4. U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics:
2000, Census Tract 155, Philadelphia County, available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo-id = 14000US42101015500&qr name=DEC_2000_SF4_U_DP3&-ds-name=D&-_lang=en (last visited Sept. 21, 2006)
[hereinafter Economic Characteristics].
5. U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Profile of Selected Social
Characteristics:
2000, Census Tract 155, Philadelphia County, available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id = 14000US42101015500&qr.name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_DP2&-dsname=D&-_lang=en (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
6. Economic Characteristics, supra note 4.
7. See Gregory, supra note 1, at 20, 22.
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abandoned houses, neighborhood organizations are planting community
8
gardens, and businesses are opening on once-decaying blocks.
Numerous nonprofit and social service organizations have played an
important role in this revitalization. 9 The Hope Partnership for Education
(the "Hope Partnership") is one of these organizations.' 0 The Hope
Partnership is a self-described "independent middle school and adult
education center,"I endorsed and founded by two Roman Catholic
12
groups-the Society of the Holy Child Jesus and the Sisters of Mercy.
The Hope Partnership insists that it is not a Catholic School and that it does
not proselytize its students. 13 The Hope Partnership serves "students of
low-income urban families, who would not otherwise have access to such
an education,"' 14 and its services are "[n]ot tuition driven."' 15 The school
currently operates in space leased from a North Philadelphia community
center and expects to increase its enrollment from 30 to 120 students. 16 To
realize this goal and further serve North Philadelphia, the Hope Partnership
planned to construct a $5.3 million educational center 17 and requested that
the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority (the "Authority") condemn land
on its behalf in eastern North Philadelphia through the exercise of eminent
domain. 18 In response, on October 20, 2002 the Authority proposed the
seizure of thirty-nine properties, which were certified as blighted in 1968,
on behalf of the Hope Partnership for a nominal price.19

8. See Sierra, supra note 3, at 93. As new money begins to pour into North
Philadelphia, however, the district has begun to experience the pressures of gentrification.
See generally Gregory, supra note 1.
9. See Sierra, supra note 3, at 93; see also Gregory, supra note 1.
10. See Hope P'ship for Educ., What is Hope Partnership for Education?,
http://www.hopepartnershipforeducation.org/ourhistory.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006)
(noting the Hope Partnership's desire to commit to the community of North Philadelphia "in
a way that reveal[s] the Face of Hope").
11. Hope P'ship for Educ., http://www.hopepartnershipforeducation.org (last visited
Sept. 21, 2006).
12. Hope
P'ship
for
Educ.,
The
Model
in
Action,
http://www.hopepartnershipforeducation.org/ourprograms.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
13. Mark Scolforo, Court: City Sinned by Seizing Home for Religious Group, Phila.
Daily News, Feb. 7, 2006, at 8 (noting that Hope Partnership does not offer religious
instruction or organized prayer, and that only two nuns are involved in the school's daily
operations). But see In re Redev. Auth. of Phila., 891 A.2d 820, 823 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006),
appeal granted, 903 A.2d 539 (Pa. 2006) (noting that the Hope Partnership described its
development plans as a "collaborative venture ...built on the long established Holy Child
and Mercy traditions of service" (internal quotations omitted)).
14. See
Hope
P'ship
for
Educ.,
The
Model
for
HOPE,
http://www.hopepartnershipforeducation.org/ourmodelofeducation.html
(last visited Sept.
21, 2006).
15. See id.
16. Tine Moore, Court Rules Agency Should Not Have Condemned House, Phila.
Inquirer, Feb. 7, 2006, at B4.
17. Scolforo, supra note 13, at 8.
18. In reRedev. Auth., 891 A.2d at 822.
19. Id. at 823.
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Homeowner Mary Smith's property on North Eighth Street was among
the condemned properties. 20 On December 23, 2003, after Philadelphia's
planning commission approved the proposal, 2 1 Mary Smith filed
preliminary objections to the condemnation, alleging in part that the taking
failed to satisfy the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement and that the
transfer of her property to the Hope Partnership violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. 22

The trial court overruled Ms.

Smith's objections, holding that "[o]nce the land was certified as blighted, it
[was] proper to then transfer the land 23to private development, regardless of
'who' that future developer may be."
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court reversed, holding that the condemnation violated the Establishment
Clause. 24 In dicta, the court noted that the condemnation also failed to
satisfy the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement because the actual

taking was to bestow a private benefit to a private religious
purpose of the
25

organization.
Religious organizations such as North Philadelphia's Hope Partnership
provide significant cultural, educational, welfare, and health services to the
general public. 26 At the same time, however, religious organizations

increasingly exert a tremendous influence on the political process and
increasingly play a prominent role in government decision-making
processes. 27 These issues, along with the public's renewed focus on the

extent of the government's eminent domain power in the wake of Kelo v.

20. Id. at 822. Although Mary Smith no longer resided in her North Eighth Street home
when the property was condemned, her daughter Veronica Smith, who resided on the
property for over fifty years, continued to live there with her family. Id. The Authority
offered Ms. Smith $12,000 as its estimated just compensation. Id. at 823.
21. Before approving the proposal, the Planning Commission held a public hearing. Id.
In mentioning this fact, however, the court made no reference to the public's or Mary
Smith's involvement (or lack thereof) in the condemnation process. Id.
22. Id. at 823-24.
23. Id. at 823 (internal quotations omitted).
24. Id. at 831 ("The law does not permit the Authority to take private property and then
turn it over to a religious organization for its private development purposes;... settled law
precludes the Authority from taking private property in violation of the Establishment
Clause.").
25. Id. at 830 n.3 (noting that although its holding was based on a "violation of the
Establishment Clause," the court could not ignore the fact that "the taking here resulted from
a plan to acquire land with public funds for the benefit of a religious organization to build a
private school" and thus failed to satisfy the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement).
26. See infra Part II.A.3.
27. See, e.g., Iver Peterson, Camden Church Groups Seek Far Broader State Aid for
City, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2001, at B2 (discussing two Camden, New Jersey church groups'
influential involvement in the City's redevelopment plans); see also Jay D. Wexler, Framing
the Public Square: God's Name in Vain: The Wrongs and Rights of Religion in Politics, 91
Geo. L.J. 183 (2002) (discussing the propriety of relying on religious reasons when reaching
decisions on issues of public concern, including law); Susan H. Williams, Religion, Politics,
and Feminist Epistemology: A Comment on the Uses and Abuses of Morality in Public
Discourse, 77 Ind. L.J. 267 (2002) (analyzing the proper role of religion in politics through
the lens of feminist epistemology); infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
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City of New London, 28 will likely lead to increased scrutiny of any
29
government decision to transfer land to a religious organization.
This Note examines whether and to what extent the government may
exercise eminent domain to condemn private property for redevelopmentin whole or in part-by a private religious organization.
Government land transfers to religious organizations have given rise to
legal challenges based on both the Fifth Amendment's public use
requirement and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Part I of
this Note examines the legal framework governing these challenges. Part
L.A explores the scope of the public use requirement, the thin line between
public and private uses when condemned land is transferred to private
parties, and courts' role in reviewing public use cases. Part I.B then
examines the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and discusses the
difficulty of line drawing in Establishment Clause cases.
Only a handful of courts have considered challenges to government
transfers of land to religious organizations. Part II examines these decisions
and explores the public policy reasons for upholding or invalidating such
transfers. Part II.A discusses cases upholding government land transfers to
religious organizations, and examines the concomitant public benefits
provided by such organizations to the general public. Part II.B discusses In
re Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, which invalidated a
condemnation of Mary Smith's and others' private land in favor of a private
religious organization, and explores the potential harms flowing from
religious land uses.
Finally, Part III argues that government land transfers to religious
organizations can pass constitutional muster. Part III.A.1 explains why in
certain circumstances the taking of private property for redevelopment by a
private religious organization can satisfy the public use requirement. Part
III.A.2 then argues that heightened judicial scrutiny is an appropriate
mechanism to guard against particularly suspect religious land transfers.
Finally, Part III.B reexamines Redevelopment Authority in light of the
standards articulated in this Note.
I.

THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

This section sets forth the legal framework governing public use and
Establishment Clause challenges to religious land transfers. Part L.A

28. 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663-64 (2005) (holding that economic development can qualify as
a "public use" for eminent domain purposes); see also Gideon Kanner, The Public Use
Clause: Constitutional Mandate or "Hortatory Fluffi'?, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 335 (2006)
(arguing that Kelo eviscerated the public use clause of any significant meaning); Vicki E.
Land & Andrew J. Sokolowski, The Overreaction to the Kelo'Decision, L.A. Lawyer, Jan.

2006, at 52 (noting that Kelo "touched off a firestorm of controversy").
29. See Gina Passarella, Eminent Domain Can't Aid Religious Groups, The Legal
Intelligencer, Feb. 7, 2006, at 1, 9 (noting that the increased number of governmentsponsored faith-based initiatives will likely lead to an increase in challenges to where those
initiatives will be placed).
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Part I.B
discusses the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement.
discusses the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and the difficulty of
line drawing in Establishment Clause cases.
A. The Public Use Requirement
This section traces the evolution of courts' interpretation and application
of the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement. Part I.A. 1 discusses the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Part I.A.2 examines the public use
requirement and the thin line between public and private uses when
condemned land is transferred to private parties. Part I.A.3 explores the
role of the judiciary when reviewing public use cases.
1. The Fifth Amendment and the Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part
that no "private property [shall] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 30 This provision, known as the Takings Clause, 3 1 is made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
32
Clause.
In ratifying the United States Constitution, state conventions advocated
for every provision in the Bill of Rights except the Takings Clause, and
there are no records of discussion regarding the Clause's meaning. 3 3 As
such, much debate has centered on the extent of the constraints imposed by
the Takings Clause on the government's power to expropriate property
from private interests through the power of eminent domain. 34 The scope
often turns on varying interpretations of the phrase
of these constraints
"public use." 35 Nineteenth century courts, for instance, took the view that
the Takings Clause limited the government's exercise of eminent domain to
instances where doing so would satisfy a "public good" or "public

30. U.S. Const. amend. V.
31. See John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the OriginalMeaning of
the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1099, 1104 (2000).
32. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897); see also
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 n.7 (1984) (the "public use" requirement is

"made binding on the States only by incorporation of the Fifth Amendment's Eminent
Domain Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause").
33. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and
the PoliticalProcess, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 791 (1995); see also Hart, supra note 31, at
1132-33 (discussing the sparse legislative record surrounding the drafting of the Takings
Clause).
34. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 934 (2003); Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original
Understandingof the So-Called "Takings" Clause, 53 Hastings L.J. 1245 (2002); Philip

Nichols Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. Rev. 615
(1940).
35. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 34; Nichols, supra note 34.
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necessity." 36 Some commentators, however, argue that these courts'
injection of a "public use" requirement into the Takings Clause represents a
fundamental misreading of constitutional text. 37 The Takings Clause was
not meant to impose any substantive limitation on government takings,
these scholars argue, but instead was intended to distinguish between those
'38
"takings which required just compensation from those that did not."
Despite such contentions, however, the public use requirement is widely
interpreted as imposing at least some substantive limitations on government
takings, and "[i]t is settled law in every American court today that private
' 39
property may not be taken by eminent domain except for a public use."
2. The Thin Line Between Public and Private Uses When Condemned
Land is Transferred to Private Parties
Despite general acceptance of the notion that the public use requirement
imposes at least some substantive limitations on government takings, there
is no bright-line rule as to the distinction between private and public uses.
This section examines the thin line that exists between private and public
uses when eminent domain is used to transfer land from one private party to
another.
The substantive limitations imposed by the public use requirement
prevent the government from exercising its eminent domain power and
40
condemning property solely for the benefit of a private interest.
Accordingly, the Court has routinely struck down takings that conferred
solely a private benefit upon a private party or that failed to provide a
41
justifying public use.
Courts' notion of what exactly constitutes a public use, however, has
changed and shifted along with their perception of when the exercise of
eminent domain is appropriate. 42 In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth

36. Harrington, supra note 34, at 1246-47 (explaining that early courts incorporated a
public use requirement into the Fifth Amendment, relying in part on the writings of Hugo
Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf).
37. See, e.g., id. at 1248.
38. Id. at 1299-1301 ("[I]t appears that in proclaiming that private property shall not be
taken for 'public use,' without just compensation, the Fifth Amendment merely declares that
the expropriations require compensation while other takings, such as tax levies or forfeitures,
do not.").
39. Nichols, supra note 34, at 615; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct.
2655, 2661 (2005) (noting that it has long been accepted that the government may not take
property from a private interest for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party,
even ifjust compensation is paid).
40. See Nichols, supra note 34, at 615.
41. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 (noting that local governments are forbidden from
taking private land for the sole purpose of conferring a private benefit on a private party);
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (same); Thompson v. Consol. Gas
Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) (same); see also Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S.
403, 416-17 (1896) (invalidating a compensated taking of a railroad right-of-way to benefit
private individuals where no justifying public purpose or use was alleged).
42. See generally Nichols, supra note 34.
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centuries, for instance, there were only a few situations in which the use of
eminent domain was deemed necessary, including rights of way and
easements. 43 In such limited circumstances, the public benefit flowing
from natural resource or infrastructure development was held to satisfy the
public use requirement. 44 By the mid-nineteenth century, however, courts
began to define "public use" as "use by the public. '4 5 This view reflected
the concern that an expansive definition of public use would justify the
taking of private property for any purpose. 46 This narrower interpretation
of the public use requirement, which proved to be difficult to administer
and impractical in its application, was short-lived. 4 7 Indeed, by the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the modern demands of industry,
transportation, mining, and agriculture led the U.S. Supreme Court to
embrace the broader
and more encompassing definition of public use as
"public purpose." 4 8
Yet, the mere assertion of an overarching public purpose is not enough to
satisfy the public use requirement. 49 If the alleged public use is merely a
pretext for conferring a private benefit upon a private interest, the taking
will not be upheld under the Takings Clause.50 An actual pretext must be
demonstrated, however, and the mere possibility of ulterior motivating
51
factors is likely insufficient to invalidate a proposed land transfer.
Further, in gauging the distinction between private and public uses, the
Court has been reluctant to establish any bright-line rule as to what portion
52
of the community must benefit to satisfy the public use requirement.
43. Id. at 617.
44. See, e.g., Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 42, 73 (N.Y.
Ch. 1831) (holding that the general public derives a benefit from railroads and, as such, the
exercise of eminent domain to seize land for railroad improvements satisfies the public use
requirement); see also Nichols, supra note 34, at 617.
45. Nichols, supra note 34, at 617-18.
46. Id. at 618.
47. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2662 (2005); Nichols, supra note
34, at 624-33.
48. Nichols, supra note 34, at 624; see Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200
U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (noting the inadequacy of the "use by the general public" definition
when determining what satisfies the public use requirement); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v.
Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 164 (1896) (holding that the taking of land for irrigation purposes
served a public purpose and thus satisfied the public use requirement).
49. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
50. Id. (noting that municipalities are not permitted to exercise eminent domain power to
take property under the pretext of a public purpose when the taking's actual purpose is to
bestow a private benefit upon a private party); see also 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster
Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that the
condemnation and transfer of land from one retailer to another was based on a desire to
transfer property from one private party to another, and that the alleged public use was
"demonstrably pretextual").
51. See Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 104 A.2d 365, 370 (Conn. 1954) (noting
that the abuse of eminent domain in a comprehensive redevelopment plan could be
"conceivable" in isolated instances, but that such possibilities did not invalidate the plan,
which clearly set forth the purposes for which property could be condemned).
52. See Rindge Co. v. County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (rejecting any
requirement that the entire community or even "any considerable portion" of a community
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By eschewing any rule that required takings to be used by the general
public, the Court opened the door for the exercise of eminent domain to
transfer land from one private interest to another. 53 In fact, the Court has
since acknowledged that the transfer of land to private interests may well be
the most effective means of achieving a public purpose. 54 In light of such a
view, the Court early on demonstrated its willingness to look beyond
challenged land transfers and to instead focus on the motivating factors
behind such transfers.5 5 In so doing, the Court upheld the condemnation of
private land to allow an individual to access a stream for irrigation, 56 the
creation of a right of way for an aerial bucket line across a private
landowner's property, 57 the taking of land, water, and water rights
58 and the
belonging to a private landowner for use by a power company,
59
another.
to
company
transfer of land from one private railroad
The Court first addressed the validity of a large-scale transfer of
condemned land to a variety of private interests in Berman v. Parker.60 In
Berman, the owner of a Washington D.C. department store challenged the
constitutionality of the taking of his property pursuant to the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. 6 1 The Act provided for the
condemnation and transfer of "blighted" land to private interests. 62 The
owner argued that his property was not blighted and that the taking of his
property violated the public use requirement because the seized land would
be managed by a private agency and redeveloped for private use. 63 The
Court upheld the transfer, speaking with approval of the public benefits that
accrue from 64plans aimed at redeveloping neighborhoods for a variety of
private uses.

directly benefit or participate in a proposed land transfer to satisfy the public use
requirement).
53. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
54. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954) ("The public end may be as well or
better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of
government .... We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the
public purposes of community redevelopment projects.").
55. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921) (observing that land transfers which
appear to be private transactions on first blush may be raised by their very "class or character
to a public affair"); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 368 (1905) (noting that the propriety of
land condemnations benefiting private interests often turns "upon many different facts, the
existence of which would make a public use, even by an individual, where, in the absence of
such facts, the use would clearly be private").
56. Clark, 198 U.S. at 369-70.
57. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1906).
58. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30,
31-33 (1916).
59. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422 (1992).
60. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
61. Id. at 28-31.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 31.
64. Id. at 33-34 (emphasizing the public purposes served by the elimination of blight and
the creation of clean, attractive, safe, and well-balanced communities).
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Berman is often cited to support the proposition that the elimination of
blight alone is sufficient to qualify as a public use. 6 5 Justice William 0.
Douglas was careful to point out, however, that it was not the elimination of
blight through condemnation alone that satisfied the public use requirement,
but also the subsequent balanced redevelopment of the land to prevent the
spread of, and possible reversion to, blight. 66 Thus, in the context of a
comprehensive redevelopment plan, a variety of future private uses must be
balanced and considered, which as a whole may contribute to a valid public
purpose. 6 7 The Court did not limit these private uses to those that were
residential in nature, but instead extended such uses to include education
and religion. 68 Outside of the context of a redevelopment plan, however,
the Court has indicated that the transfer of land to private interests could run
afoul of the public use requirement. 6 9 As such, courts tend to invalidate
land transfers allegedly serving the public purpose of "redevelopment"
70
where such transfers were not made pursuant to any design or plan.
The Court next considered the validity of a large-scale transfer of
condemned land to a variety of private interests in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff 7 1 In Midkiff the trustees of landholding estates
challenged the constitutionality of Hawaii's Land Reform Act of 1967,
which aimed to reduce the concentration of land ownership in the state by
providing for the condemnation of privately held land and transferring
ownership of the condemned land to existing lessees. 72 The Court upheld
the Act, finding that the elimination of the harms associated with land

65. See, e.g., Fishman v. City of Stamford, 267 A.2d 443, 448 (Conn. 1970) ("It has long
been settled that, when.., the redevelopment agency formulates a plan for the alleviation of
blight and takes land pursuant to that plan, it is taking land for a public purpose, namely, the
rehabilitation of the area. This public purpose is not affected by the agency's subsequent
resale of the property to private redevelopers."); 64th St. Residences, Inc. v. City of N.Y.,
150 N.E.2d 396, 399 (N.Y. 1958) (discussing the "valid municipal purpose of eliminating a
slum").
66. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 34-35 (noting that the city's planning commission had
determined that if the community were to remain healthy and vibrant, it "must be planned as
a whole"); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 n.13 (2005) (noting
that if the public use in Berman were defined more narrowly, there would have been little
justification for the proposed redevelopment plan).
67. Berman, 348 U.S. at 34-35.
68. Id. ("The entire area needed redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan could be
developed for the region, including not only new homes but also schools, churches, parks,
streets, and shopping centers." (emphasis added)).
69. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661, 2667 & n.17 (discussing but not reaching the issue of
whether one-to-one transfers of property to private interests outside the confines of a
comprehensive redevelopment plan violate the public use requirement, and noting that courts
tend to view such transfers with a "skeptical eye").
70. See, e.g., 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (invalidating a municipality's transfer of land from one private
retailer to another for expansion purposes where no integrated development plan existed, and
the land transfer "rest[ed] on nothing more than the desire to achieve the naked transfer of
property from one private party to another").
71. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
72. Id. at 233.
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oligopolies served a valid public purpose. 73 The Court emphasized the
broad scope of the public use requirement, 74 and held that the probability of
a condemnation accomplishing its stated objectives is irrelevant so long as
the government could have believed that it would accomplish those
objectives. 75 By focusing on the condemnation's purpose (to deconcentrate
land ownership) instead of its mechanics (the transfer of land to private
parties), the Court reaffirmed its willingness to look beyond challenged land
transfers and to instead focus on the motivating factors behind such
76
transfers.
The Supreme Court, in Kelo v. City of New London, provided both clarity
77
and confusion as to where the line between public and private uses lies.
In Kelo the Court addressed the validity of New London's redevelopment
plan, which aimed to reinvigorate its economically depressed downtown
and waterfront areas. 78 The plan called for the acquisition of land from
unwilling sellers through the power of eminent domain and the transfer of
that land to private developers. 79 The Court, noting that promoting
economic development is a well-established government function, held that
economic development qualifies as a public use for eminent domain
80
purposes.
If the Court's forward-looking approach to the exercise of eminent
82
domain was implicit in its holding in Berman,8 1 it was explicit in Kelo.
While emphasizing its traditionally broad understanding of "public use,"
the Court rejected any contention that a valid taking must eliminate a
harmful property use.8 3
Instead, the Court interpreted its takings
jurisprudence as depending on a private party's future use of the seized
property, and held that "[b]y focusing on a property's future use, as
opposed to its past use, our cases are faithful to the text of the Takings
Clause." 84
This prospective approach to public use determinations
indicates that the Court likely will require something more than the mere

73. Id. at 241-43 (holding that the redistribution of fees simple to eliminate market
inefficiencies caused by land oligopolies was a classic exercise of Hawaii's police powers
and a rational exercise of its eminent domain power).
74. Id. at 240 (noting that the public use requirement and a sovereign's police powers
are coterminous).
75. Id. at 242. This deferential viewpoint is reflected in the Court's preference for a
rational-basis standard of review. See infra Part I.C. 1.
76. Id. at 245 (noting that the Act was enacted "not to benefit a particular class of
identifiable individuals but to attack certain perceived evils of concentrated property
ownership in Hawaii-a legitimate public purpose").
77. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
78. Id. at 2658.
79. Id. at 2658-59.
80. Id. at 2665 (relying on Berman and emphasizing that the challenged takings were to
be executed pursuant to a comprehensive development plan).
81. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
82. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665-66, 2666 n.16.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2666 n.16.
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certification of blight to satisfy the public use requirement. 8 5 Although
some commentators contend that Kelo eviscerated the public use
requirement of any substantive meaning,8 6 the Court rejected any argument
87
that its holding blurred the boundary between public and private takings.
3. Courts' Role in Reviewing Public Use Cases
This section examines the role that courts typically play when reviewing
public use cases. Part I.A.3.a discusses the deference most courts give to
local determinations of public use-a deference that is often compared to
Part I.A.3.b examines some courts' and
rational-basis review.
commentators' arguments in favor of heightened judicial scrutiny of public
use determinations in certain circumstances.
a. RationalBasis Review
As the Court began to embrace a broader and more encompassing
definition of public use as "public purpose," 88 it also began to allow
legislatures and municipalities significant latitude in determining which
land uses served a public purpose. 89 This latitude includes the ability to
determine that a community be "beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, [and] well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." 90 The
Court in Midkiff justified this deferential treatment of public use cases
through its belief that legislatures were best equipped to determine which
public purposes should be advanced through the exercise of eminent
domain. 9 1 In fact, Justice Douglas went so far as to note that legislative
determinations of public uses are "well-nigh conclusive." 92 Thus, courts'
role in reviewing public use determinations is generally viewed as being

85. Compare supra notes 83-84, with supra note 65.
86. See, e.g., Kanner, supra note 28.
87. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666.
88. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925) (holding
that a congressional determination that the condemnation of land for military purposes
constitutes a public use is "entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an
impossibility"); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906)
(refusing to second-guess the Utah legislature's determination that the state's public welfare
demanded aerial bucket lines across private landowners' property); see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct.
at 2664 ("For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid
formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.").
90. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
91. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984); see Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664
(noting that judicial deference to legislative public use determinations recognizes the varying
and evolving needs that exist throughout the country); Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (noting that
the legislature, not the judiciary, is the appropriate custodian of the public purposes served
by the takings power).
92. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
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extremely narrow. 93 When deferring to legislative discretion in public use
cases, courts typically engage in a rational-basis standard of review:
"[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking
94
to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause."
The Court reaffirmed its commitment to rational-basis review of public
use determinations in Kelo by rejecting any requirement that the transfer of
land to private interests undergo a heightened form of scrutiny or "require a
'reasonable certainty' that the expected public benefits will actually
accrue." 9 5 Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo was careful to note,
however, that the Court's commitment to rational-basis review did not alter
the public use requirement's prohibition against land transfers benefiting
'96
private interests "with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.
b. HeightenedJudicialScrutiny
Despite the Supreme Court's consistent endorsement of rational-basis
review in public use cases, some lower courts have engaged in heightened
judicial scrutiny of land transfers to private interests.
In Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,97 for example, a neighborhood
association and individual residents challenged the exercise of eminent
98
domain to transfer land to General Motors for economic development.
Although the court upheld the condemnation, it noted (without citation) that
when "the condemnation power is exercised in a way that benefits specific
and identifiable private interests, a court inspects with heightened scrutiny
the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being

93. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984); Midkiff 467 U.S. at 240;
Berman 348 U.S. at 32. The U.S. Supreme Court has been careful to note, however, that any
deference it gives to legislative or municipal public use determinations does not altogether
eliminate courts' role in reviewing such determinations. See Midkff, 467 U.S. at 240. But see
Kanner, supra note 28 (arguing that Kelo eviscerated the Public Use Clause of any
significant meaning).
94. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241; W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648, 671-72 (1981) ("[W]hether infact the provision will accomplish its objectives is not the
question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if... the [state] Legislature rationally
could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective."); see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at
2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (characterizing the Court's deferential standard of review as
rational-basis review); cf F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 309, 313 (1993)
(applying the rational-basis test to review economic regulation under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment).
95. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667-68 (noting that postponing judicial review of
condemnations until the likelihood of such condemnations' success was assured would have
a chilling effect on redevelopment plans).
96. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that such transfers, if demonstrated by
a "clear showing," should be struck down).
97. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
98. Id. at 457-58.

2006]

PUBLIC USE OR PRIVATE BENEFIT?

1117

advanced." 99 Other courts, although not explicitly endorsing a heightened
form of review, have closely examined such condemnations (and their
alleged justifications) with a probing, critical eye.10 0 Such approaches, that
look not only to the alleged public use but also to the necessity of the
takings themselves, differ significantly from the deferential standard of
review that courts typically engage in when reviewing public use cases. 10 1
Although the Supreme Court generally has adhered to rational-basis
review of takings cases, 10 2 it has indicated that it would be suspicious of
any exercise of eminent domain to transfer land from one private interest to
another outside of a comprehensive redevelopment plan. 10 3 The Court's
skepticism could indicate the possibility of heightened judicial scrutiny in
such circumstances. 10 4 Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo was much
more explicit as to when strict or heightened scrutiny could be appropriate:
[A] more stringent standard of review than that announced in Berman and
Midkiff might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn category of
takings. There may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected
impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption
(rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use

Clause. 105
Justice Kennedy agreed, however, with the majority's conclusion in Kelo
that heightened judicial scrutiny was not required merely because the
alleged public purpose of the taking was economic development. 10 6 In
refusing any departure from rational-basis review, Justice Kennedy
identified five characteristics of challenged public takings that militate
against heightened scrutiny:
(1) the presence of a comprehensive

99. Id. at 459-60 (noting that any public benefit flowing from such condemnations
cannot be "speculative or marginal," and finding that the condemnation at issue served a
"clear and significant" public purpose).
100. See, e.g., Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 111 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1998) (refusing to uphold condemnation of private land for redevelopment as a
casino based on a detailed and comprehensive examination of the condemnation's purposes,
consequences, and effects); City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d
365, 370, 374 (N.D. 1996) (refusing to uphold condemnation of two privately held parking
lots for redevelopment by a retail store, where even though the taking was "subject to limited
judicial review," there were no specific findings as to the details surrounding the primary
object of the development project).
101. See Nancy K. Kubasek, Time to Return to a Higher Standardof Scrutiny in Defining
Public Use, 27 Rutgers L. Rec. 3, 10 (2003) (noting that such approaches, even though not
explicitly characterized as heightened judicial scrutiny, are more likely to determine whether
challenged takings further a public purpose).
102. See infra Part I.A.3.a.
103. See supra note 69; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667
(2005) (noting that the issue of one-to-one transfers would be addressed if and when it
arose).
104. But see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-43 (2005) (holding that

heightened judicial scrutiny in the form of a "substantially advances" formula has no place in
the Court's takings jurisprudence).
105. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106. Id.
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development plan; (2) the seriousness of the problems addressed by the
takings; (3) the nature of the benefits flowing from the takings; (4) the
identity of the takings' beneficiaries being unknown; and (5) the presence
of elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate public review and
inquiry into the proposed takings. 107
Some commentators disagree with courts' nearly uniform adherence to
rational-basis review, especially in cases where eminent domain is used to
transfer land from one private party to another. 10 8 One-to-one land
transfers give rise to numerous concerns regarding the preservation and
sanctity of individual property rights, 10 9 the uncertainty of the proposed
benefits flowing from such transfers, 110 the disproportionate effect such
transfers have on the politically vulnerable,"' and the susceptibility of local
officials to powerful private interests. 1 12 In light of such concerns-along
with the Court's expansive interpretation of the public use requirementthese commentators argue that one-to-one land transfers should be
subjected to some form of heightened judicial scrutiny. 113 Although the
details of the proposed standards of review differ, 114 these commentators
107. See id. At least one commentator has argued that procedural safeguards that ensure
public scrutiny of condemnations and land transfers could "thwart the corruption and unfair
dealing" commonly associated with land use decision making. See Alejandro Esteban
Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality,
Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions-Installment Two,
24 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 269, 279 (2005).
108. See, e.g., Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 Vill. L.
Rev. 207 (2004) (arguing that heightened scrutiny is appropriate where eminent domain is
used to transfer property to a private party).
109. Jonathan Neal Portner, The Continued Expansion of the Public Use Requirement in
Eminent Domain, 17 U. Balt. L. Rev. 542, 552 (1988).
110. See Kubasek, supra note 101, at 7 (noting that benefiting private parties are rarely
held accountable to the public, thus preventing the alleged public benefits from being
realized); Nader & Hirsch, supra note 108, at 220-21 (discussing the inability to determine
whether alleged public benefits flowing from such transfers would ever accrue).
111. See Nader & Hirsch, supra note 108, at 224-26 (arguing that heightened scrutiny is
appropriate where takings adversely affect groups that historically have been subject to
unfavorable treatment).
112. Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and JudicialReview in Eminent
Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 409, 432-35 (1983) (arguing that judicial deference to local
public use decisions is often inappropriate due to reasons of institutional competence,
impartiality, and potential for abuse).
113. See Kubasek, supra note 101; Nader & Hirsch, supra note 108; Portner, supra note
109.
114. Compare, e.g., Kubasek, supra note 101, at 10 (arguing that one-to-one transfers
should be upheld only where (1) the state identifies a legitimate public purpose, (2)
substantial evidence demonstrates that public benefits will likely flow from the taking, and
(3) the taking is necessary to achieve the public purpose), with Nader & Hirsch, supra note
108, at 224-25 (arguing that one-to-one land transfers should be upheld only where the state
demonstrates a "compelling need for the transfer" which cannot be met by a less harmful
alternative, but noting that such transfers may be upheld if they are "substantially connected
to an important government purpose" so long as the affected party suffers primarily
economic loss and is not politically powerless), and Portner, supra note 109, at 556 ("[T]he
condemnor must show that the taking serves [an] urgent and necessary governmental
interest.").
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agree that rational-basis review is an inappropriate mechanism of reviewing
one-to-one land transfers.15
B. Opaque Readings of the Establishment Clause: The Difficulty of Line
Drawing
Even if a state's or municipality's exercise of eminent domain satisfies
the public use requirement, such takings can run afoul of other
constitutional guarantees.1 16 Thus, some lower courts have addressed
Establishment Clause challenges to government land transfers, 117 invariably
drawing from the Court's public use jurisprudence. 118 This section
provides a brief introduction to the legal framework governing these
challenges.
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion." 1 9 This provision, known as the Establishment Clause, 120 does
12 1
not provide courts with any precisely defined constitutional prohibitions.
Accordingly, the Court has been reluctant to draw any bright-line
interpretation as to what constitutes a violation of the Establishment
Clause, 122 and instead tends to provide general guidance as 23
to what are
permissible and impermissible church and state entanglements. 1
Generally, the Court has taken a broad interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, and has noted that the First Amendment merely requires the state to
24
be neutral-not adversarial-in its relations with religious organizations.
In fact, the Court has noted that "[s]ome limited and incidental
entanglement between church and state authority is inevitable in a complex

115. See Kubasek, supra note 101, at 9; Nader & Hirsch, supra note 108, at 213-14;
Portner, supra note 109, at 554.
116. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667 & n.17 (2005); cf Viii. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (reinstating the plaintiff's claim that the
municipality's exercise of eminent domain violated the Equal Protection Clause).
117. See infra Part II.A.2, B. 1.
118. See, e.g., infra note 159 and accompanying text.
119. U.S. Const. amend. I.
120. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
121. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
122. See Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 550 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing the
Supreme Court's reluctance to confine Establishment Clause analysis to any one test), cert.
denied, 524 U.S. 953 (1998).
123. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (noting that the
Establishment Clause precludes the government from aiding a single religion, aiding all
religions, preferring one religion over another, or becoming involved in the activities of
religious organizations).
124. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-18; cf Boyajian v. Gatzunis, 212 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2000)
(noting that by "protecting religious uses of land among others that are favored by
communities generally, but that may encounter particular neighborhood disfavor, [a zoning
exemption for religious institutions] does not itself advance religion but clears the way so
that churches themselves may do so").
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modem society."' 25 Thus, although the Establishment Clause ensures that
the government does not make religious belief relevant to an individual's or
group's position in the political community, 126 it does not forbid
government policies27 with legitimate secular objectives from incidentally
benefiting religion. 1
The closest the Court has come to a bright-line delineation of
Establishment Clause violations is the three-pronged Lemon test, which
requires government activity to (1) have a secular purpose; (2) neither
advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion. 128 Notably, when addressing Establishment
Clause challenges to religious land transfers, lower courts' analysis of the
"secular purpose" prong is strikingly similar to courts' analysis of the
public use requirement.' 29 Although many state and lower courts continue
to apply the Lemon test, 130 most Supreme Court Justices differ at least to
some extent as to the test's
applicability, and some have expressed their
31
hostility towards the test. 1
Part II of this Note explores cases that have applied this legal framework
to religious land transfers. In these cases, most courts have upheld such
transfers as consistent with Supreme Court precedent.' 32 Part II.A
discusses these cases, and explores the public policy reasons for upholding
such transfers. Not all cases, however, have upheld such transfers. In
Redevelopment Authority, for instance, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court invalidated a condemnation in favor of a private religious school,
finding violations of both the Establishment Clause and the Fifth
125. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982). Some courts have gone so
far as to hold that government actions that advance both secular and religious goals still pass
constitutional muster. See Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 316 F. Supp. 2d
1201, 1236 (D.Utah 2004).
126. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
government endorsement of religion "sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community" (internal
quotations omitted)).
127. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (finding that the goals of the
government and private religious interests may at times overlap).
128. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
129. See infra note 158.
130. See, e.g., Southside Fair Housing Comm. v. City of N.Y., 928 F.2d 1336, 1356 (2d,
Cir. 1991); In re Redev. Auth. of Phila., 891 A.2d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006),
appealgranted,903 A.2d 539 (Pa. 2006).
131. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 717 n.6 (2005) (discussing the Lemon test
and noting that the Court would resolve the case "on other grounds"); id. at 726 n. I
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Court properly declines to [apply] the discredited test of
Lemon v. Kurtzman.").
132. See, e.g., Southside FairHousing, 928 F.2d at 1347, 1356 (following Berman and
upholding city's sale of urban renewal land to the Hasidic religious community); Ellis v.
City of Grand Rapids, 257 F. Supp. 564, 570-71 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (upholding
condemnation in favor of a church-affiliated hospital); Kintzele v. City of St. Louis, 347
S.W.2d 695, 701-02 (Mo. 1961) (citing Berman and upholding a transfer of blighted land to
private Jesuit university).
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Amendment's public use requirement. 133 Part II.B discusses this case, and
explores the potential harms flowing from religious organizations.
II. PUBLIC USE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS

LAND TRANSFERS

A. Upholding Religious Land Transfers
In light of the thin line that separates private and public uses, most lower
courts, when confronted with public use or Establishment Clause
challenges, have upheld the validity of condemnations or land transfers in
favor of religious institutions. This section examines these decisions. Part
II.A.1 discusses the public use analysis used in these cases and Part II.A.2
discusses their Establishment Clause analysis. Finally, Part II.A.3 explores
the public policy reasons for upholding religious land transfers, and
examines the educational, cultural, and health services that religious
institutions provide to the general public.
1. Public Use Challenges to Religious Land Transfers
Most courts generally have found religious land transfers to be valid
public policy consistent with Supreme Court precedent. 134 In Ellis v. City
of GrandRapids, for example, the city's "Master Plan for Urban Renewal"
called for the acquisition of land through the exercise of eminent domain for
the development of a medical center by St. Mary's Hospital-a churchaffiliated institution. 135 The stated objectives of the plan, which aimed to
strengthen and define the city's central business district, included the
removal of blight and deterioration, the elimination of substandard
structures, the modification of an obsolete street pattern, the provision of
residential uses, and the establishment of a medical center.1 36 Although the
13 7
plaintiff did not pose a Fifth Amendment challenge to the condemnation,
13 8
the court analyzed in detail the public purpose of the transfer.
The court acknowledged that the land transfer would confer a private
benefit to St. Mary's to the extent that it would have the opportunity to
purchase land for a lower price than if it would have had to negotiate

133. In re Redev. Auth., 891 A.2d at 830 n.3, 831.
134. See, e.g., Kintzele, 347 S.W.2d at 702 (approving of planning authority's policy to
not acquire property held by religious institutions and to accept such institutions as

redevelopers; noting that various churches, a YMCA, and the Christian Board of Publication
took advantage of this policy, and that the "United States Supreme Court recognized this
policy as proper" in Berman).

135. Ellis, 257 F. Supp. at 567.
136. Id.
137. The objecting landowner's complaint alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, along with violations of Michigan state law.
Id.
138. Id. at 569-72.
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separately with private landowners. 139 However, the court held that the
"participation by a private sectarian hospital as a redeveloper in an urban
renewal project is not unconstitutional."' 140 The court took a broad
approach to what satisfies a public use, essentially holding that any uses
subsequent to condemnation were irrelevant. 14 1 The court also emphasized
142
that it found no pretext in the land's condemnation.
Similarly, in Kintzele v. City of St. Louis,14 3 the city proposed to sell
"blighted" land to St. Louis University, a private Jesuit university, pursuant
to a comprehensive redevelopment plan aimed at eliminating blight.'14 The
plaintiffs challenged the transfer in a taxpayers' action, alleging
unconstitutional use of public funds in aid of a religious organization and an
unconstitutional taking of private property for private use. 145 The Missouri
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' contentions, noting that the case
before it did not involve the condemnation and transfer of a single tract of
land to a private religious interest, but instead the acquisition of an entire
area for the public purpose of eliminating blight. 146 In upholding the
transfer, the court emphasized that the University was acquiring the land by
purchase instead of by condemnation and gave great deference to the city's
147
determination of a public use.
Another example is Fishman v. City of Stamford,148 in which the city
proposed to take land held by a Roman Catholic Church to increase
affordable housing, eliminate blight pursuant to a redevelopment plan, and
replace that land with other contiguous land so as to not reduce the church's
land holdings. 14 9 The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs'
Establishment Clause and public use objections, emphasizing that the basic
purpose of the land transfer was to provide affordable housing for the city's
residents without displacing the church. 150 These public benefits, in the
context of a plan to alleviate blight, led the court to hold that the taking of
land from a private landowner and the subsequent transfer of that land for

139. Id. at 569.
140. Id. at 570. The court also noted that in the context of a comprehensive
redevelopment plan, the use of condemned property by private persons for private uses is
irrelevant and the partial allocation of such land to churches is unimportant. Id. at 571.
141. Id. at 571. This broad approach resulted from the court's emphasis on the public
purpose served by the taking itself (the elimination of blight). The court still noted,
however, the public nature of the subsequent uses of the property once it was seized (the
provision of medical services to the general public). Id. at 574.
142. Id. at 574 (noting that the primary purpose of the taking was to provide adequate
medical care to the surrounding community, which overrode any incidental or indirect
benefits flowing to a private religious interest).
143. 347 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1961).
144. Id. at 697-98.
145. Id. at 697.
146. Id. at 701.
147. Id. at 701-02.
148. 267 A.2d 443 (Conn. 1970).
149. Id. at 444-45, 448.
150. Id. at 446-47.
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religious use did not make the original taking one for private purposes. 15 1
Finally, the court expressed no doubt that a redevelopment
agency could
52
include churches as part of its development plan. 1
2. Establishment Clause Challenges to Religious Land Transfers
Some lower courts, although not faced with Fifth Amendment challenges
to land transfers to religious organizations, have analyzed the public
purpose of such transfers when addressing Establishment Clause claims.
The Establishment Clause's opaque language gives rise to a degree of
uncertainty as to whether land transfers to religious interests implicate First
Amendment concerns. 153 Most courts that have addressed land transfers or
condemnations in favor of religious interests,
however, have upheld the
54
transfers after applying the Lemon test.1
Consider Southside Fair Housing Committee v. City of New York, 155 for
instance, where plaintiffs alleged Establishment Clause violations flowing
from the city's proposed sale of urban renewal property in Williamsburg,
Brooklyn to the United Talmudic Academy for the development of a boys'
yeshiva, a faculty apartment complex, and a 6000-seat synagogue.156 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the Court's Lemon
test to the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge and determined that the
city's sale of land to the Hasidic community did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 157 The court found a secular purpose for the sale of
158
land to a religious institution within the context of urban renewal plans.
In analyzing the land transfer's secular purpose, the Second Circuit drew
upon the Supreme Court's public use jurisprudence and emphasized courts'
deference to local determinations of public purpose so long as no pretext is
present. 159 Accordingly, the court "look[ed] behind" the challenged land
transfer and focused on the underlying development plan.160 The court, as
previous courts had, took a broad retrospective approach as to what
constitutes a public use, holding that urban renewal plans, by their very
nature, benefit the public by improving depressed areas. 16 1 In the context
151. Id. at 447-48 ("It has long been settled that, when.., the redevelopment agency

formulates a plan for the alleviation of blight and takes land pursuant to that plan, it is taking
land for a public purpose, namely, the rehabilitation of the area. This public purpose is not
affected by the agency's subsequent resale of the property to private redevelopers .... ").
152. Id. at 447 ("[T]he mere fact that a plan ... provides for the retention of a church
plant in a given area does not render that plan unconstitutional.").
153. See generally Part I.B.
154. See, e.g., infra notes 157, 173, 180 and accompanying text.
155. 928 F.2d 1336 (2d Cir. 1991).
156. Id. at 1338.
157. Id. at 1356.
158. Id. at 1348. The court's analysis of the land transfer's secular purpose was strikingly
similar to public use analysis. For a discussion of the Lemon test, see supra notes 128-31
and accompanying text.
159. See id. at 1347-48.
160. Id. at 1347.
161. Id.
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of such plans, the court held, land could62be sold to numerous private
interests, including religious organizations. 1
The primary effect of the land transfer, the court found, "was to dispose
of urban renewal property that might otherwise lie fallow. The fact that the
[Hasidic community was] the incidental beneficiar[y] does not make the
system by which the land sales were consummated constitutionally
infirm."' 63 The court further noted that the sale did not require any
continuing relationship between the city and the Hasidic community, and
thus did not reflect any excessive government entanglement with
164
religion.
New York City's proposed condemnation of land lying within the
Lincoln Square Project area on Manhattan's West Side from 60th Street to
70th Street gave rise to similar objections. 165 A portion of the condemned
land was to be conveyed to Fordham University, a Roman Catholic
institution, for "collegiate or educational purposes."' 166 Although no Fifth
Amendment challenges were raised, holders of this land did challenge the
public purpose of the proposed transfer, claiming that it amounted to an
"unconstitutional grant or subsidy of public moneys to a religious"
organization. 167 The New York Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs'
contentions. 168 Although the court acknowledged that Fordham would
receive a private benefit to the extent that it would be permitted to acquire
valuable property, it balanced this benefit against the public benefits the city
would receive through "the achievement of its valid municipal purpose of
eliminating a slum."'1 69 The court concluded that any alleged "subsidy of
public moneys" merely reflected the difference in land value resulting from
70
Fordham' s agreement to clear the land and use it for restricted purposes. 1
Similarly, in In re Condemnation by the Minneapolis Community
Development Agency, 17 1 the Minneapolis Community Development
Agency filed a petition for condemnation to acquire land pursuant to a
comprehensive redevelopment plan for the restoration, expansion, and
construction of new facilities for several interests, including the Young
172
Men's Christian Association of Metropolitan Minneapolis ("YMCA").
The court applied the Lemon test and held that the condemnation
proceeding neither advanced religion nor resulted in excessive government

162. Id. (citing Berman and noting that on numerous occasions New York City had sold
urban renewal land to churches and other houses of worship).
163. Id. at 1349. The court held that "within the context of an urban renewal scheme,
there is a secular purpose for sales of land for houses of worship-of any type." Id. at 1348.
164. Id. at 1351.
165. 64th St. Residences, Inc. v. City of New York, 150 N.E.2d 397, 397-98 (N.Y. 1958).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 398.
168. Id. at 398-99.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 398.
171. 439 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 1989).
172. Id. at 709.
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entanglement with religion, and thus did not violate the Establishment
Clause. 173 The court noted that for First Amendment purposes, "the
question is not whether the YMCA has religious aspects, which admittedly
it does, but the extent to which the religious dimension permeates the
institution." 174 The plaintiff conceded that the proceeding had a secular
legislative purpose, 175 and the court found no Establishment Clause
violation because the YMCA's secular functions were not subsumed by its
religious mission. 176 Finally, the court held that the coordination of
planning and construction between the YMCA and the Authority did not
create any excessive entanglement with religion. 177
Likewise, in Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp.,178 although no
condemnation was involved, plaintiffs challenged the City's sale of an
easement to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints ("LDS"),
alleging violations of the Establishment Clause. 179 The court applied the
Lemon test and upheld the transfer, finding numerous underlying secular
purposes, including the resolution of a contentious legal dispute, the
promotion of tourism, and the City's receipt of land to be used by the
general public as consideration for the easement. 180 The court held that the
City's sale did not have the primary effect of advancing or endorsing
religion, especially because LDS paid over ten times the market value of the
land, and in light of the land the City received in exchange for the
easement.1 8 1 Finally, because the sale ended the City's involvement in any
the
regulation of the church's use of the easement, it actually eliminated
82
likelihood of excessive entanglement between the City and LDS.1
3. Religious Institutions and Their Public Uses
In upholding condemnations in favor of religious organizations, courts
have acknowledged the potential for public benefits to flow from such
organizations.' 83 This section examines these public benefits.
Modem land use law generally recognizes that many religious
organizations do not exist solely to provide a means of worship for their
faithful. 184 Religious organizations have dramatically extended the breadth
173. See id.at 712-14.
174. Id.at 712.
175. Id.at 711.
176. Id. at 712 (noting that the YMCA provided "nonsectarian recreational, health, and
social service activities without regard for any religious belief or affiliation").
177. Id. at 714.
178. 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Utah 2004).
179. Id. at 1204-05.
180. Id. at 1238. The court ignored the possibility that improper concerns could have
motivated the land transfer, in light of its secular benefits. Id. at 1239-40.
181. Id. at 1241-42.
182. Id. at 1244-45.
183. See, e.g., supra notes 141-42; supra text accompanying notes 166, 180.
184. See Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 319 N.Y.S.2d 937, 946 (Sup. Ct. 1971)
(rejecting any contention that religious uses must be conducted solely for the benefit of a
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of their activities, especially in the areas of education and social services.] 85
Today, religious organizations serve functions "ranging from bingo, to
scout meetings, to lectures, to community action programs, to interfaith
programs."' 186 In many instances, such organizations provide not only
private services to their members, but also numerous philanthropic, cultural,
educational, welfare, and health services to the general public, 187 thus
demonstrating the many potential public uses of religious organizations.
Additionally, some religious institutions provide services whose secular
aspects predominate over any religious aspects, 18 8 demonstrating that
religious belief and the benefits provided by religious institutions are not
necessarily inextricably linked. 189
The Hope Partnership's provision of much-needed educational services
to North Philadelphia exemplifies the potential for public benefits to flow
from religious institutions. 190
Hospitals operated by religious
organizations, for example, provide significant public, secular benefits to
the surrounding community and often do not operate solely for the benefit
of private religious interests. 19 1 Such institutions provide services to the
general public and do not discriminate in the provision of necessary and
often life-saving medical care. 19 2 Education is another essential public
service provided by private religious institutions, and so long as religious
schools comply with curriculum requirements, such schools often enhance
the general welfare. 193 In fact, some commentators urge that "no difference
religious institution's members); see also Shelley Ross Saxer, When Religion Becomes a
Nuisance: Balancing Land Use and Religious Freedom When Activities of Religious
Institutions Bring Outsiders into the Neighborhood,84 Ky. L.J. 507, 513-19 (1996).
185. Mark W. Cordes, Where to Pray? Religious Zoning and the FirstAmendment, 35 U.

Kan. L. Rev. 697, 737 (1987).
186. Slevin, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
187. See Terry Rice, Re-evaluating the Balance Between Zoning Regulations and

Religious and Educational Uses, 8 Pace L. Rev. 1, 2-4 (1988) (noting that churches and
religious organizations no longer provide solely means of worship, but also serve "a variety
of social, humanitarian, and educational functions").
188. See In re Condemnation by the Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency, 439 N.W.2d 708,
712 (Minn. 1989) (finding that religious organization with religious aspects nonetheless
provides "nonsectarian recreational, health, and social service activities without regard for
any religious belief or affiliation").
189. The tension between religious institutions' religious and secular functions can give
rise to doubt as to the public benefits flowing from such institutions, as well as to uncertainty
regarding the potential for Establishment Clause violations. See infra Parts II.B. 1, Il1.
190. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
191. See Ellis v. City of Grand Rapids, 257 F. Supp. 564, 571 n.2 (W.D. Mich. 1966)
(noting that the proposed uses of the property in question included ambulatory care,
treatment, radiology, laboratories, diagnostic and mechanical facilities, housing for
personnel, the aged, and parking); see also Kentucky Bldg. Comm'n v. Effron, 220 S.W.2d
836, 837-38 (Ky. 1949) (holding that the construction of nonprofit, religious hospitals serves
the common good of the entire community).
192. See Ellis, 257 F. Supp. at 572.
193. Tilton v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 1191, 1198-99 (D. Conn. 1970) (noting that the

Supreme Court has long recognized that church-sponsored schools play a significant role in
the provision of secular education); see Roman Catholic Archbishop of Diocese of Ore. v.
Baker, 15 P.2d 391, 395 (Or. 1932).
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exists in the promotion of the general welfare of a community between
public and private educational institutions." 194 As such, the public benefit
provided by religious schools is often viewed to be the same as the benefit
provided by public schools. 195 Other public services provided by religious
institutions 196 include drug rehabilitation centers, 197
universities,1 98
20
homeless shelters,' 99 day care centers, 200 and orphanages. '
The public benefits flowing from these services make such religious
organizations desirable components of a community, 202 especially because
these services often compensate for inadequate local, state, and federal
ftnding to care for those in need. 20 3 Due to the many benefits flowing from
religious institutions, some courts have held that religious institutions are by
their very nature beneficial to the public welfare. 204 The use of land by
religious institutions is thus often found to have a beneficial and significant
relationship to the "public health, safety, and general welfare." 20 5 In light
of the unique role held by churches and other religious institutions in
American society, many courts have held that such institutions deserve
special treatment in certain circumstances. 20 6 Accordingly, religious
194. Rice, supra note 187, at 40; cf Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton,
136 N.E.2d 827, 834 (N.Y. 1956) (disapproving of ordinances that exclude private or
parochial schools from residential areas where public schools are permitted).
195. Vill. of Brookville v. Paulgene Realty Corp., 200 N.Y.S.2d 126, 133 (Sup. Ct. 1960)
("[T]he contribution which a private school makes to the public good in educating
youngsters, is rendered nonetheless valid because it earns a profit.").
196. See, e.g., Shim v. Washington Twp. Planning Bd., 689 A.2d 804, 811 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1997) (noting that church's day care center, Lamaze classes, and job search
and training programs would be offered to all members of the surrounding community).
197. Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 319 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
198. Kintzele v. City of St. Louis, 347 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1961).
199. St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983); Susan L. Goldberg, Gimme Shelter: Religious Provision of
Shelter to the Homeless as a Protected Use Under Zoning Laws, 30 Wash. U.J. Urb. &
Contemp. L. 75 (1986).
200. Shim, 689 A.2d at 804; Unitarian Universalist Church of Cent. Nassau v. Shorten,
314 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
201. Vill. of Univ. Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphans' Home, 20 F.2d 743 (6th Cir.
1927).
202. See Tarshis v. City of N.Y., 262 N.Y.S.2d 538, 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965)
(Benjamin, J., dissenting) ("Enlightened community planning, recognizing the desirability of
such [religious organizations], traditionally has assisted in making available land upon which
cultural centers, colleges, universities, community centers and health institutions could be
built.").
203. Saxer, supra note 184, at 551; see also Goldberg, supra note 199, at 75-76 (noting
that inadequate government funding to address homelessness has required religious
institutions to play a primary role in assisting those in need of shelter).
204. See Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836-37
(N.Y. 1956) ("[C]hurch and school and accessory uses are, in themselves, clearly in
furtherance of the public morals and general welfare.").
205. Congregation Dovid Ben Nuchim v. City of Oak Park, 199 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1972).
206. See, e.g., Saxer, supra note 184, at 508 (noting that religious institutions generally
enjoy special treatment in the application of legislative land use restrictions); see also Walz
v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Glovemment
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institutions are often protected, at least to some degree, from the application
20 7
of zoning regulations.
B. InvalidatingReligious Land Transfers
This section discusses the invalidation of condemnations or land transfers
in favor of religious institutions and explores the public policy reasons for
striking down such transfers.
1. One Court Has-Invalidated a Land Transfer in Favor of a Religious
Institution
Not all courts have found religious land transfers to satisfy the public use
requirement and the Establishment Clause.2 0 8 In Redevelopment Authority,
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court applied the Lemon test to determine
whether the transfer of land to the Hope Partnership violated the
Establishment Clause 20 9 and reached a different result than other courts in
its application of the test. 2 10 In a 4-3 decision, the court found that the
transfer lacked any secular purpose because the Authority's primary
purpose in the condemnation was to acquire land on behalf of the Hope
Partnership for the construction of a religious school. 2 11 The court further

grants exemptions to religious organizations because they uniquely contribute to the
pluralism of American society by their religious activities.").
207. See Saxer, supra note 184, at 512 (noting that most jurisdictions prevent the absolute
exclusion of religious institutions from areas zoned for residential use only); see also Cornell
Univ. v. Bagnardi, 503 N.E.2d 509, 513 (N.Y. 1986) (noting that schools and churches,
which historically "were welcomed as benefits to the neighborhood," have enjoyed special
treatment as to residential zoning ordinances).
208. Several lower courts, for instance, have indicated in dicta that condemnations and
land transfers in favor of religious institutions have at least the potential to violate the public
use requirement and the Establishment Clause. See Policastro v. City of Boston, No. 044279, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 579, at *19 (Mass. Super. Nov. 8, 2005) (holding that
plaintiff taxpayer could "contest the sale of publicly owned land at a below-market price to a
religious institution for the purposes of operating a house of worship and the endorsement of
a particular religion and excessive entanglement created by the establishment of a particular
lecture program at a public college"); Cont'l Enters., Inc. v. Cain, 387 N.E.2d 86, 90 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1979). The court in ContinentalEnterprises stated that
[t]he fact that the party seeking the condemnation is of a religious, educational or
other "public benefit" nature does not entitle it to take private land for its own
purposes rather than for public purposes. That view has been expressly disavowed
lest ". . . churches, lodges, clubs, civic organizations ....
theatres, circuses ... an
endless chain ....
acquire a power which is an attribute of sovereignty.
387 N.E.2d at 90 (quoting Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 155 N.E. 4655 472 (Ind. 1927)).
209. In re Redev. Auth. of Phila., 891 A.2d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006), appeal
granted,903 A.2d 539 (Pa. 2006).
210. Id. at 831 ("The law does not permit the Authority to take private property and then
turn it over to a religious organization for its private development purposes;... settled law
precludes the Authority from taking private property in violation of the Establishment
Clause.").
211. Id. at 830 (holding that the land acquisition for the Hope Partnership "had a primary
religious effect because it directly aided the religious organization's mission to provide faithbased educational services, among other things, to residents in the blighted area").
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found that the Authority worked closely with the Hope Partnership
throughout the planning and acquisition process, thus demonstrating
excessive government entanglement with religion. 2 12 Without any broader
secular purpose, the court held that the exercise of eminent domain to
transfer land to a private religious organization could not withstand Mary
2 13
Smith's Establishment Clause challenge.
The court also stated in dicta that the condemnation failed to satisfy the
public use requirement because the actual purpose of the taking was to
bestow a private benefit to the Hope Partnership, a private religious
organization. 2 14 The court noted that the condemnation did not result from
a comprehensive economic development plan, but instead from "a plan to
acquire land with public funds for the benefit of a religious organization to
build a private school" and therefore could not satisfy the public use
requirement. 2 15 The court's holding was based on a violation of the
Establishment Clause, and as a result it did not conduct a thorough analysis
of the City's development plan or its purported goals, other than mentioning
that the plan was created pursuant to a general certification that the
2 16
surrounding area was blighted.
Three judges dissented, asserting that the Authority "may exercise
eminent domain power to condemn a private homeowner's property when
the property is located in a blighted neighborhood." 217 The dissent took a
retrospective approach to the condemnation, and indicated that once
blighted land is seized "the public purpose is completely realized. ' 218 In
addressing plaintiffs Establishment Clause claims, the dissent noted that
the purpose of the condemnation was not to establish religion, but instead to
"serve individuals who live in an economically depressed area."'2 19 The
dissent also emphasized that despite the Hope Partnership's religious
affiliation, it served community members with "a variety of religious
backgrounds and beliefs. ' 220 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
dissent noted that the challenged condemnation did not involve a one-toone transfer from a private party to a private religious organization, but
instead involved many condemnations pursuant to a comprehensive
22 1
development plan.
The Authority appealed the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's
decision, and on July 27, 2006 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted
212. Id.
213. Id.

214. Id. at 830 n.3.
215. Id. But see infra note 221 and accompanying text.
216. In re Redev. Auth., 891 A.2d at 823, 830 n.3.
217. Id. at 831 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 833 (internal quotations omitted).
219. Id. at 834.
220. Id. at 832 (internal quotations omitted).
221. See id. at 832 n.4 ("The Commission's proposal not only included projects to be
developed by Hope Partnership, but also included projects for development by 14 other
groups ....).
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the Authority's Petition for Allowance of Appeal. 2 22 As of this writing, the
At first blush, the Pennsylvania
resolution of this case is unclear.
Commonwealth Court-consistent with Supreme Court precedentproperly looked to the future use of the seized property when invalidating
the transfer. 223 If in fact the Hope Partnership negotiated with the
Authority to achieve a one-to-one land transfer, the court was rightfully
suspicious of the condemnation. 2 24 If, however, the land was condemned
pursuant to a comprehensive redevelopment plan and sufficient procedural
safeguards were in place to protect the condemnee, the court turned a blind
eye to the potential for public benefits to flow from the transfer, and its
225
holding was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
As this case demonstrates, the resolution of public use and Establishment
Clause challenges to land transfers varies depending on the facts of a
particular case. Given the thin line between private and public uses and the
Establishment Clause's opaque language, a degree of uncertainty exists as
to whether and when condemnations and land transfers to religious interests
give rise to public use and First Amendment concerns. This uncertainty, as
explained in Part III, gives rise to additional judicial concern surrounding
the exercise of eminent domain in favor of religious interests.
2. The Potential Harms of Religious Land Uses
This section explores the potential harms flowing from religious land
uses. In evaluating land use decisions in favor of religious institutions,
courts are careful to focus on the secular-and not the religious-benefits
flowing from such institutions. 22 6 Courts often weigh these positive secular
benefits against any harms that could potentially flow from the
institutions. 227 There is no conclusive presumption that the public benefits
flowing from religious institutions outweigh the harms. 228 Many groups
have objected to the presence of religious institutions in their communities,
at least in part due to the "increased traffic, noise, and litter; an increased
tax burden to neighbors due to the religious use exemption from taxes; and
229
the influx of people from outside the local residential community."

222. In re Redev. Auth., 903 A.2d 539.
223. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
224. Cf supra note 70 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text; infra Part III.
226. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1,12 (1989) (focusing on the
church property tax exemption's "legitimate secular purpose and effect of contributing to the
community's moral and intellectual diversity").
227. See Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 503 N.E.2d 509, 514-15 (N.Y. 1986) (noting that
despite the many benefits flowing from religious institutions, such institutions' presence may
in fact detract from the public's health, safety, welfare, or morals due to their adverse effects
on traffic, property values, congestion, and municipal services).
228. Id. at 515; see also John Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven: A Story of Violent
Faith (2003) (discussing the dangers of religious fundamentalism).
229. Saxer, supra note 184, at 509; see also Jonathan D. Weiss & Randy Lowell,
Supersizing Religion: Megachurches, Sprawl, and Smart Growth, 21 St. Louis U. Pub. L.
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Further, relying on religious organizations to provide education and social
services to the general public has the potential
to result in "reduced quality,
230
unequal treatment, and outright corruption."
Additionally, although religious institutions provide significant public
benefits to their surrounding communities,'they also increasingly exert a
tremendous influence on the political process. 231 Consider Camden
Churches Organized for People, an influential Camden, New Jersey
religious organization. 2 32 Although the organization aims to alleviate
crime, substandard housing, and inadequate healthcare, it also takes "the
Bible as a serious guide for involving [itself] in the community in order to
promote love and justice and to enhance the dignity of every member of
[its] congregations and community. '23 3 The organization played a
prominent and influential role in Camden's redevelopment during the city's
fiscal crisis in 2001,234 thus demonstrating religious organizations' ability
235
to dominate the local political process and land use decision making.
Finally, despite the numerous potential public uses of religious
institutions, courts do not ignore the potential for religious doctrine or
beliefs to intermix with the secular services provided by these
institutions. 236 In fact, sometimes courts acknowledge that the very reason
religious organizations provide services to the general public is to advance
their religious mission. 237 Accordingly, courts are not hesitant to invalidate
land use decisions that impermissibly establish religion. 238 The balance
between the potential public benefits flowing from religious institutions and

Rev. 313, 315 (2002) ("Sprawl and the growth of megachurches appear to be mutually
reinforcing concepts.").
230. Martha Minow, Public and PrivatePartnerships: Accountingfor the New Religion,
116 Harv. L. Rev. 1229, 1246 (2003) (discussing the dangers posed by excessive
government reliance on religious organizations to meet basic public needs).
231. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
232. Peterson, supra note 27.
233. Camden Churches Organized for People (CCOP), CCOP Covenant,
http://www.camdenchurches.org/about.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
234. Peterson, supra note 27 (noting that CCOP "provided important political support for
the state's varying proposals for New Jersey's poorest city").
235. Cf Robert R. Wright, Exclusionary Land Use Controls and the Taking Issue, 8
Hastings Const. L.Q. 545, 568-69 (1981) (discussing "[a]buses at the local level" in which
"developers and real estate interests overwhelm local officials and generally ravage the
public interest").
236. Cf. Shim v. Wash. Twp. Planning Bd., 689 A.2d 804, 811 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997) (noting that day care centers operated by religious institutions provide a valuable
community service, but also holding that child day care centers are "an integral part of a
church's ministry" thus qualifying as an incidental use of church facilities in the zoning
context).
237. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970) ("[T]o assure future
adherents to a particular faith" is "an affirmative if not dominant policy of church schools.");
Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, Inc., 224 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir. 2000)
("The very existence of the school is premised on a religious mission.").
238. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (holding that a
statute giving churches the power to veto liquor license applications within a 500-foot radius
of the church violated the Establishment Clause).
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the concomitant risk for Establishment Clause violations is a factor in
determining the extent to which eminent domain may be used to transfer
239
land to a private religious institution.
III. CONDEMNATIONS IN FAVOR OF RELIGIOUS INTERESTS CAN SATISFY
THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT

Religious organizations provide significant cultural, educational, welfare,
and health services to the general public, 240 a fact that often legitimizes the
government's imposition of favorable land use exemptions. 24 1 The public
benefits flowing from religious organizations, however, are in constant
tension with the tremendous influence these organizations often exert on the
political process.2 42 This tension is amplified by an underlying concern that
government involvement in religious land use issues could implicate
Establishment Clause concerns. 243 These issues, along with the public's
244
renewed focus on the extent of the government's eminent domain power,
will likely lead to increased scrutiny of any decision to transfer land to a
24 5
religious organization through the exercise of eminent domain.
This part argues that courts should reject any bright-line rule invalidating
government land transfers to religious institutions. Part III.A.1 explains
why in certain circumstances the taking of private property for
redevelopment by a private religious organization can satisfy the public use
requirement. Part III.A.2 argues that heightened judicial scrutiny is an
appropriate mechanism to guard against particularly suspect religious land
transfers. Finally, Part III.B reexamines Redevelopment Authority in light
of the standards articulated in this Note.
A. Government Takings that Benefit PrivateReligious OrganizationsCan
Pass ConstitutionalMuster
1. Religious Land Transfers Are Not Per Se Unconstitutional
Eminent domain can be a powerful and effective tool for furthering
municipal land use goals. The Supreme Court broadly interprets the Fifth
Amendment's public use requirement, and generally upholds government
takings so long as they satisfy an overarching public purpose. 246
Accordingly, courts long ago rejected any bright-line rule that invalidated
the transfer of land to private parties through eminent domain. 247 It is the
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See infra Part III.A.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.2, B. 1; supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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public benefit flowing from the taking-and not the identity of the
benefiting party-that matters when analyzing public use cases. 248 Thus,
the mere fact that a religious institution benefits from a government land
249
transfer should be insufficient to invalidate such a transfer.
Further, the Court's prospective approach to condemnations in Kelo
indicates that the propriety of Fifth Amendment takings should turn on the
future use of the seized property 25° -an approach that ensures that the
taking is indeed intended to serve a public purpose. 25 1 Thus, the propriety
of condemnations in favor of religious interests will likely turn on those
interests' future use of the land and the public benefits flowing from those
252
uses, regardless of the religious identity of the benefiting party.
In recognition of the numerous public benefits flowing from religious
organizations and their concomitant positive influence on the general
welfare, municipalities often grant such organizations land use
exemptions. 253 These facts indicate that many municipalities will include
such organizations in their comprehensive growth, development, or
redevelopment plans. 2 54 The Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the
validity of this policy in Berman by including churches (and, implicitly,
other religious interests) in its list of private land uses to be balanced and
considered when redeveloping a neighborhood. 2 55 Any bright-line rule
invalidating all government transfers of seized land to religious interests
would not only ignore the numerous public benefits that flow from these
institutions, 256 but also deny municipalities the ability to include a variety
of private uses in their development plans. 257 In practice, lower courts
generally have followed this reasoning and have rejected such a bright-line
rule. 258 In fact, the vast majority of these courts have upheld religious land
259
transfers.
A variety of factors should be relevant to courts' review of challenged
260
condemnations and land transfers in favor of religious organizations.
When present, these factors strongly militate in favor of judicial deference
248. See id.
249. See, e.g., supra note 152.

250. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 84.
252. See supra note 85.

253. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., supra note 162.
255. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
256. See supra Part II.A.3.
257. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., Southside Fair Hous. Comm. v. City of N.Y., 928 F.2d 1336, 1348 (2d Cir.

1991) (rejecting the argument that the sale of city property to a Hasidic community "could
inherently serve no secular purpose"); Ellis v. City of Grand Rapids, 257 F. Supp. 564, 570

(W.D. Mich. 1966) (holding that "participation by a private sectarian hospital as a
redeveloper in an urban renewal project is not unconstitutional"); supra note 152.
259. See supra Part II.A.
260. These factors mirror some of the characteristics which led Justice Anthony Kennedy
to refuse to strike down New London's condemnation in Kelo. See supra text accompanying
note 107.
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to legislative or local public use determinations, so long as the challenged
26 1
takings have more than merely incidental or pretextual public benefits.
First, the presence of a comprehensive development plan would strongly
indicate the absence of any pretextual purpose in legislative or municipality
decision making. 2 62 The inclusion of religious organizations in such plans
263
is consistent with the valid policy of comprehensive community planning
and rarely gives rise to suspicions as to whether solely a private benefit is
being conferred upon a private religious interest. 264 Further, when a
religious organization is only one of many benefiting larties in a
comprehensive development plan, it is less likely that the organization has
captured the political process or was the primary influence motivating the
transfer. 26 5 In contrast, the alleged public benefits flowing from one-to-one
transfers of condemned land to religious interests have an increased
likelihood of being pretextual because such interests could have hijacked
266
the condemnation process through negotiations outside of the public eye.
Commentators have expressed concern as to the negative impacts that flow
267
from such bilateral deal making between localities and private interests.
In holding that the condemnation of Mary Smith's home conferred a private
benefit upon a private religious interest, the court in Redevelopment
Authority acknowledged these concems,2 68 while the court in Southside
Fair Housing ignored such concerns in its failure to conduct any
prospective inquiry into the nature of the proposed land use by the Hasidic
community.269

Second, courts should consider the presence or absence of procedural
270
safeguards when reviewing condemnations in favor of religious interests.
In light of judicial recognition of the public benefits flowing from the
redevelopment of slums or blighted areas, 27 1 municipalities primarily tend
to condemn land that is considered undesirable. 2 72 The exercise of eminent
domain thus has the potential to disproportionately affect the politically and
261. Cf supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 27, 67-69, 231-34 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 27, 67-69, 231-34 and accompanying text; see also Alejandro
Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering
Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions,
Installment One, 24 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, 41 (2005) (noting that negotiations regarding private
development plans "are too frequently shielded from not only direct but also indirect
observation and input by the other parties the proposed development affects").
267. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 266, at 5 (noting that these negative impacts "all too
often fall on community members with little direct influence on the planning process").
268. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. The record is unclear, however, as to
whether in fact the condemnation existed independently of any comprehensive
redevelopment plan. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., supra notes 62, 78-79, 136, 149 and accompanying text.
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economically disenfranchised. 273 Often, courts are the only protection
condemnees have against abusive land-use decisions. 274 For instance,
despite the public hearings conducted by the Authority in Redevelopment
Authority, the judicial system may have been Mary Smith's only real
275
protection against the -Authority's decision to condemn her home.
Procedural safeguards can ensure that these organizations do not completely
hijack condemnation proceedings and can give politically
vulnerable
276
individuals a means of objecting to the seizure of their land.
Additionally, by encouraging public review and inquiry into
condemnations that benefit religious interests, procedural safeguards can
expose both the public and private benefits flowing from such
condemnations that otherwise may have remained hidden from the general
public. 277 Courts may be more suspicious of takings benefiting religious
interests when the steps leading up to the condemnations took place behind
closed doors. 278 Conversely, widespread public involvement in the
decision-making process leading up to condemnations could offer courts
reassurance that the challenged condemnations indeed benefit the public as
a whole, instead of solely private religious interests. 2 79 Strikingly,
however, cases that have addressed the transfer of land to religious interests
280
are bereft of any real analysis of this issue.
Third, courts should consider whether or not the identity of the benefiting
religious interest was known at the time condemnation proceedings were
commenced. 28 1 If the identity of the benefiting party is only determined
after a tract of land is condemned, the risk of the alleged public purpose
being pretextual is reduced. 282 Because the identity of a benefiting party is
at times necessary to begin the negotiations leading up to the condemnation,
however, the context of the taking is significant in determining the
relevance of the benefiting party's known identity. 283 For instance, if land
is condemned to make way for a medical center, as in Ellis, the fact that a
religious hospital is the eventual recipient is unlikely indicative of any
legislative desire to solely confer a private benefit upon a religious

273. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 21, 24-25 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 107 and accompanying text; see also Camacho, supra note 107, at
284 (noting that procedural safeguards increase both the transparency and the quality of local
land use decisions).
278. Cf supra note 107 and accompanying text; see Camacho, supra note 266, at 6
("[Ilmportant land use decisions are frequently made in closed-door negotiations that
exclude many affected parties, further disenfranchising those with the least influence and
fewest resources.").
279. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
280. See generallysupra Part II.
281. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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interest. 284 By the same token, if land is condemned to benefit a particular
religious hospital (or a particular house of worship as in Southside Fair
Housing,2 85 or a particular educational facility as in Redevelopment
Authority),2 86 a court should examine whether the condemnation aimed to
provide the public benefits flowing from 287
the religious organization or
instead merely benefit the organization itself.
Finally-and perhaps most obviously-courts should consider the scope
and nature of the alleged public benefits flowing from the challenged
transfer. 2 88 Condemnations in favor of religious organizations that provide
services to the general public-such as hospitals, schools, and day care
centers-will likely confer significant public benefits on the surrounding
community, regardless of any incidental benefits such condemnations may
confer upon the religious organizations themselves. 289 As such, the courts
in 64th Street Residences2 90 and Ellis29 1 properly focused on the public
benefits flowing from the educational and medical services provided by the
benefiting organizations. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, by
contrast, failed to conduct any probing inquiry into the nature of the public
benefits flowing from the educational services provided by the Hope
Partnership. 29 2 Condemnations in favor of churches, synagogues, and other
houses of worship may raise more difficult questions as to the nature of the
public benefits flowing to the surrounding community. 293 Thus, in
Southside Fair Housing, for instance, the court should have evaluatedinstead of ignored-the extent of the public benefits flowing from the
Hasidic community's future use of the land in question. 294
2. Heightened Judicial Scrutiny Can Guard Against Particularly Suspect
Religious Land Transfers
Courts have long allowed legislatures and municipalities significant
latitude in determining which land uses serve a public purpose. 29 5 This
judicial deference reflects a general belief that local planning officials are
most familiar with the land use needs of the communities they serve and are

284. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
287. Cf supra note 215 and accompanying text. In Redevelopment Authority, for
instance, the Hope Partnership appears to have been one of fourteen organizations included
in the city's development plan, thus potentially reducing any risks that the condemnation
aimed to confer a private benefit to a private religious organization. See supra note 221 and
accompanying text.
288. See supra note 107 and accompanying text; supra Part II.A.3.
289. See supra Part II.A.3.
290. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 142, 191 and accompanying text.
292. See supra Part II.B. 1.
293. Cf. supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
294. See supra text accompanying note 163.
295. See supra Part I.A.3.a.
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capable of determining the necessary and proper components of their
development 297
plans. 296
These components often include religious
organizations.
The above-mentioned characteristics reduce the likelihood that religious
organizations have captured the condemnation process and indicate the
absence of any pretextual purpose in legislative or municipality decision
making. 298 Accordingly, these transfers should be upheld so long as such
299
condemnations are rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.
300
and
This standard of review is consistent with Supreme Court precedent
acknowledges the minimal risk that these condemnations pose of conferring
solely a private benefit upon a private religious interest. Judicial deference
to such transfers also maximizes the public benefits flowing from religious
organizations' presence in a community 30 1 and recognizes the institutional
the
competence of planning officials and local authorities in determining
30 2
necessary and proper components of their development plans.
Similarly, condemnations benefiting religious organizations that lack the
above characteristics are particularly suspect. Such takings give rise to
heightened concerns as to whether private interests have captured the
condemnation process, the potential for pretextual purposes in legislative 3or
03
municipality decision making, and the possibility for political favoritism.
These concerns, and the concomitant potential for Establishment Clause
violations, 30 4 militate in favor of heightened judicial scrutiny of such
transfers.
Although few courts have explicitly endorsed heightened judicial review
of public use determinations, 30 5 a handful have reviewed condemnations
that benefit private interests with a critical eye by looking beyond the
alleged public use to the necessity of the takings themselves. 30 6 Further,
although the Court has yet to address the propriety of the exercise of
eminent domain to transfer land from one private interest to another outside
of a comprehensive redevelopment plan, it has expressed skepticism as to
whether such transfers could pass constitutional muster. 30 7 In fact, given
the likelihood that such transfers are the result of political favoritism,

296. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 262,
279, 282.
299. See supra Part I.A.3.a.
300. See supra Part I.A.3.a.

301. See supra Part II.A.3.
302. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 107, 266, 285-87 and accompanying text; text accompanying note
293.
304. See supra Part II.B.1.
305. See supra Part I.A.3.b.

306. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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Justice Kennedy has indicated that they warrant heightened judicial scrutiny
30 8
under the Public Use Clause.
Condemnations lacking the above-mentioned characteristics give rise to
some of the concerns that have led several commentators to argue for
heightened judicial scrutiny of eminent domain decisions. 30 9 In many cases
the purported public benefits flowing from such transfers are extremely
uncertain and often difficult to discern. 310 The transfer of condemned land
to a house of worship within the context of a comprehensive development
plan, for example, could likely achieve its stated public purpose (that is, the
achievement of a planned, well-balanced community). In the absence of
such a plan, the likelihood of achieving the stated public purpose could be
diminished. In Southside Fair Housing, for instance, had the court chosen
to take a prospective approach when evaluating the challenged land
transfer, it likely would have had difficulty finding any significant public
benefits flowing from the Hasidic community's subsequent private use of
3 11
the land.
Procedural safeguards can ensure that any alleged public purpose is welldocumented and supported, while at the same time potentially reveal any
hidden pretextual purposes behind the taking. 3 12 Absent these safeguards,
there may be a decreased likelihood that the alleged benefits will in fact
accrue. 313 Additionally, land transfers to religious interests whose alleged
public benefits are more than de minimis likely present diminished
3 14
concerns as to whether those benefits will actually accrue.
Condemnations lacking the above-described characteristics also have an
increased likelihood of disproportionately affecting the politically
vulnerable. Municipalities have a tendency to condemn land held in
blighted areas, 3 15 and condemnations that lack development plans or
procedural safeguards only increase this tendency. Condemnees such as
Mary Smith are often underrepresented in local decision-making
processes, 3 16 and judicial deference to local public use determinations in
these situations would in effect result in judicial abandonment of
individuals with the greatest need for judicial protection. Additionally,
local officials are often vulnerable to powerful local interests, 317 and a oneto-one land transfer to a religious organization could indicate political
favoritism or an undetected hijacking of the political process--especially
3 18
given the influence religious interests often wield in the political arena.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 270-80.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 288-94.
See, e.g., supra notes 62, 78-79, 136, 149 and accompanying text.

316. See supra note 21.

317. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 27, 231-35 and accompanying text.
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In the absence of any overarching plan or set of goals, it would be difficult
to determine whether the transfer was indeed intended to provide any
3 19
benefits other than those bestowed directly to the religious organization.
If such transfers were only subject to rational-basis review, local authorities
would have little incentive to ensure the fulfillment of the public use
320
requirement.
Perhaps most importantly, any public benefits flowing from
condemnations in favor of religious interests are in constant tension with
the potential for such condemnations to run afoul of the Establishment
Clause. 32 1 Without any more specific guidance from the Court, lower
courts will likely continue to apply the Lemon test to Establishment Clause
challenges to religious land transfers 322-a process that invariably draws
from the Court's public use jurisprudence. 323 Given the Court's opaque
reading of the Establishment Clause, 324 a significant degree of uncertainty
surrounds the validity of these transfers. This uncertainty is greatly
increased in the absence of the above-mentioned characteristics because
such transfers are likely to give rise to skepticism as to the condemnations'
secular purposes and increase the possibility for government entanglement
in religion.
Given the similarities between the public use requirement and the Lemon
test's "secular purpose" prong, 325 and courts' invariable reliance on public
use jurisprudence when reviewing Establishment Clause challenges to
religious land transfers, 326 the limitations imposed by the public use
requirement are perhaps coterminous with those imposed by the
Establishment Clause.
Thus, satisfaction of the above-mentioned
characteristics could greatly reduce any risk for such transfers to implicate
327
Establishment Clause concerns.
To alleviate the tension between municipalities' desire to confer public
benefits
through
condemnations
lacking the
above-mentioned
characteristics and the potential such takings have for political favoritism
and Establishment Clause violations, courts should focus on both the
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 159 and accompanying text.

324. See supra Part I.B.

325. See supra note 158.
326. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
327. Further, by ensuring that religious land use decisions satisfy the public use
requirement, courts can ensure the validity of both the challenged condemnation and the
subsequent transfer, whereas satisfaction of the Establishment Clause would only ensure the
validity of the transfer and subsequent use of the property, and not the validity of the
condemnation itself. Cf In re Redev. Auth. of Phila., 891 A.2d 820, 834 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2006), appeal granted, 903 A.2d 539 (Pa. 2006) (Pellegrini, J., dissenting) ("Even assuming
that there was a contract in existence and it violated the Establishment Clause, that does not
justify setting aside the condemnation. An Establishment Clause violation would only
render the contract unenforceable.").
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necessity of the takings themselves and on the likelihood that the alleged
public benefits will flow from the takings. 328 Such transfers should be
upheld only where (1) substantial evidence demonstrates that legitimate
public benefits will likely flow from the taking; and (2) the taking is
necessary to achieve the public benefits. 32 9 This heightened form of
judicial review will protect the politically disenfranchised from the abuse of
eminent domain, while ensuring that communities will still benefit from the
services provided by religious organizations, 330 so long as such benefits are
likely to accrue.
B. The Hope Partnership: Public or Private Use?
Under the standards articulated above, the Authority's exercise of
eminent domain in favor of the Hope Partnership in Redevelopment
Authority is of uncertain validity. The organization provides much-needed
educational services to a struggling neighborhood with dire educational
needs, and the public benefits flowing from these services are hardly de
minimis. 33 1 At first blush, however, some of the circumstances surrounding
the condemnation of Mary Smith's home are troubling. The Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court's opinion indicates that the condemnation resulted in
the naked transfer of land from Ms. Smith (and other private homeowners)
to a private religious organization, 332 a fact that is strongly indicative of a
private benefit being conferred upon a private party. 333 The record is
unclear as to this point, though, and it appears that the condemnation may
3 34
have been conducted pursuant to a comprehensive redevelopment plan.
A public hearing of the proposed condemnation was held, thus permitting
public scrutiny of the condemnation. 33 5 The extent of the public's
involvement in this hearing, however, is unclear, 336 which raises doubts as
to the adequacy of this procedural safeguard. Further, not only was the
identity of the Hope Partnership known when the condemnation
proceedings were commenced, but in fact it was the Hope Partnership itself
that approached the Authority about the prospect of condemning land on its
behalf 337-a fact that increases any risk that the alleged public purpose of
the condemnation was pretextual. 33 8 Finally, the Hope Partnership is a
private religious organization run by two Roman Catholic Groups 339-a

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See supra Part I.A.3.b.
See supra note 114.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 281-87.
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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fact that increases concerns regarding the propriety of the condemnation 340
(and a fact that indeed led the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to strike
34 1
down the condemnation as a violation of the Establishment Clause).
Nevertheless, the Hope Partnership claims that it does not proselytize its
students and provides a secular education to children in a struggling
neighborhood. 34 2 Given the uncertain nature of the facts surrounding the
condemnation,
a more rigorous evaluation of the condemnation is necessary
34 3
on appeal.
Heightened judicial scrutiny of the condemnation would be appropriate if
on appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finds that the condemnation
resulted in the naked transfer of land to the Hope Partnership, that the
public hearing failed to ensure public scrutiny of the condemnation, and
that any public benefits flowing from the condemnation (i.e., educational
services) are outweighed by the private benefit conferred upon the Hope
Partnership. In such a case, the court should uphold the condemnation only
if substantial evidence demonstrates that the alleged public benefits will
likely flow from the condemnation, and only if the condemnation is
necessary to achieve these public benefits. 344 This heightened scrutiny
would not necessarily invalidate the condemnation, but it certainly would
provide greater protection against the abuse of eminent domain.
Similarly, if the court determines that the condemnation was conducted
pursuant to a comprehensive redevelopment plan, that the public hearing
adequately protected the homeowners' interests, and that the public services
provided by the Hope Partnership outweigh the private benefit conferred
upon the Hope Partnership, rational-basis review is appropriate. Such an
approach is consistent with Supreme Court precedent 345 and would ensure
that North Philadelphia can continue to benefit from the public benefits
provided by the Hope Partnership.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has long recognized the role that religious
346
institutions can play in the redevelopment of blighted neighborhoods.
Municipalities have not been hesitant to condemn land in favor of such
institutions. 347 Such condemnations, however, give rise to a complex and
often tense relationship between church and state. Powerful, moneyed
religious institutions, for instance, can use eminent domain to dominate

340. See supra text accompanying note 321.
341. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
343. For instance, the presence of fourteen other organizations in the purported
redevelopment plan is strongly indicative of a lack of pretext in the condemnation, but the
Commonwealth Court failed to address this fact. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
344. See supra text accompanying note 329.
345. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
347. See supra Part II.A.
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land use decision making in areas populated by the politically vulnerable. 34 8
Such a phenomenon is problematic, especially because there are public
benefits that extend from such condemnations that do not necessarily
require the religious engagement of the affected community.
Denying municipalities the ability to include religious organizations as
one of the recipients of condemned land, however, would both stifle local
planning efforts, and also deny communities the numerous public benefits
flowing from religious organizations. 349 Nevertheless, the public nature of
religious land transfers is not always clear, and such transfers may also give
rise to Establishment Clause concerns. 350 Such concerns can be reduced in
the presence of a comprehensive redevelopment plan, procedural
safeguards, a detailed evaluation of the land transfer's public benefits, and
351
the presence of arms-length negotiations leading up to the condemnation.
In the absence of these characteristics, heightened judicial scrutiny can
effectively ensure that public benefits indeed flow from a challenged
condemnation, 352 thus reducing the potential for religious interests to
dominate land use decision making while still permitting the public to
continue to benefit from the services offered by such interests.

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

See supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part Il.B.1.
See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra Part III.A.2.

